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Legal status and the criminal activity of immigrants
By Giovanni Mastrobuoni and Paolo Pinotti∗
We exploit exogenous variation in legal status following the Jan-
uary 2007 European Union enlargement to estimate its effect on
immigrant crime. We difference out unobserved time-varying fac-
tors by i) comparing recidivism rates of immigrants from the “new”
and “candidate” member countries; and ii) using arrest data on
foreign detainees released upon a mass clemency that occurred in
Italy in August 2006. The timing of the two events allows us to
setup a difference-in-differences strategy. Legal status leads to a 50
percent reduction in recidivism, and explains one-half to two-thirds
of the observed differences in crime rates between legal and illegal
immigrants.
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In most developed countries the connection between immigration and crime is a heavily
debated issue. Specifically, opinion surveys show that in North America and Europe citizens
are deeply concerned about the perceived link between crime and immigrants, especially
illegal ones (Mayda, 2006; Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2012). We argue that part of
the debate might be driven by a vicious cycle between crime, citizens’ perceptions, and
migration restrictions.
Citizens may easily base their perceptions about the relationship between immigration
and crime on the disproportionate presence of immigrants in Western prisons (see Figure
1)1. These figures increase the support for migration restrictions, preventing potential
immigrants from legally residing in the destination country (Waters and Simes, 2013; Dinas
∗ Mastrobuoni: University of Essex, Collegio Carlo Alberto, IZA, and Netspar, Wivenhoe Park, CO34SQ Colch-
ester, UK, gmastrob@essex.ac.uk. Pinotti: Bocconi University and BAFFI Center, Via Roentgen 1, 20136 Milan,
Italy, paolo.pinotti@unibocconi.it. This is a heavily revised version of a previous paper circulated with the title
Migration Restrictions and Criminal Behavior: Evidence From a Natural Experiment. We would like to thank Josh
Angrist, Federico Cingano, David Card, Giacomo De Giorgi, Raquel Fernandez, Andrea Ichino, Justin McCrary,
Enrico Moretti, Alfonso Rosolia, Adriaan Soetevent, Giordano Zevi, and seminar participants at the FEEM-CEPR
Conference on Economics of Culture, Institutions and Crime, the Center for Studies in Economics and Finance in
Naples, the University of Padua, the University of Paris X, the INSIDE Workshop in Barcelona, the NBER Sum-
mer Institute 2010 (Labor Studies and Crime groups), the Universitat van Amsterdam, Cornell University, Brown
University, the Royal Economic Society Conference 2011 (special session on Immigration and Crime), and the LIEPP-
Chicago Crime Conference for very useful comments. Financial support from the Collegio Carlo Alberto, the W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, and Fondazione Antonveneta is gratefully acknowledged. Giovanni Mas-
trobuoni thanks the staff at INSIDE at Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona University for their hospitality. Giancarlo
Blangiardo kindly provided the ISMU data.
1Only recently has the US Department of Homeland Security released official data showing that immigrants appear
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and van Spanje, 2011). However, stringent restrictions produce a pool of unauthorized
immigrants, those who cross the border illegally or simply over-stay their tourist visas.2
Migration restrictions are often coupled with work restrictions. Illegal immigrants are thus
precluded from taking legal jobs and from receiving welfare benefits, which in turn would
lower their opportunity cost of committing crimes. If this increases their criminal attitude
and their likelihood of being imprisoned, the vicious cycle begins.
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Figure 1. : Share of foreigners over prison population and total population in some OECD
countries
Note: This figure shows the incidence of foreigners among the prison and total populations in some OECD countries
in year 2000, or, when unavailable, in nearby years.
Source: OECD
Whether there is such a cycle depends on the causal relationship between immigrants’
legal status and crime. In principle the relationship can be quite complex, and before
explaining how we plan to tackle this issue, it is useful break down the total effect into three
parts. Granting legal status may (i) increase the inflow of new immigrants from abroad, (ii)
prevent the deportation of those who are already present in the country, and (iii) reduce
their propensity to engage in criminal activity, thanks to better outside opportunities in
the legal sector. Since (i) and (ii) increase the pool of potential criminals, the sign of the
overall effect is clearly ambiguous. Moreover, only (ii) and (iii) involve immigrants who
are illegally residing in the country before legal status is granted.
This study will focus on estimating the effect on precisely these immigrants. The absence
of official statistics on the illegal population, and the potential selection into legal status,
2In many developed countries the ratio between illegal and legal immigrants is estimated to be close to 1/3 (see
Fasani, 2008).
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constitute the main challenges to the identification of such an effect.
We address these two issues by exploiting, respectively, exogenous variation in legal sta-
tus after the European Union (EU) enlargement of January 1, 2007 (the “treatment”),
and unique data on the universe of prison inmates that were pardoned with the Collective
Clemency Bill enacted in Italy five months before the enlargement, on August 1, 2006. As
a consequence of the sudden, massive release of prison inmates, we can track contempora-
neous recidivism of “treated” and “non-treated” immigrants during the periods before and
after the enlargement (respectively, the light and dark areas in Figures 2 and 3).
The left panel of Figure 2 shows, on a six month frequency, the number of foreign prison
inmates since 2012. The size of the foreign prison population decreased by 7,000 units,
from about 20,000 to 13,000, between June 2006 and December 2006. This was largely
a product of the pardon, which freed about 8,000 individuals in August 2007 and a few
more over the following weeks (see the right panel of Figure 2). However, many of these
individuals were soon rearrested–about 1,000 already by January 2007 (gray line).
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Figure 2. : Foreign prison population (left) and the number of inmates released and rein-
carcerated (right)
Note: The left figure plots the number of foreigners in prison since 1995, on a six month frequency. The right panel
shows the number of foreign prison inmates released after the Collective Clemency Bill in August 2006 (left axis), as
well as those re-incarcerated throughout December 2007 (right axis). The vertical line refers to the moment of the
EU enlargement.
Source: Ministry of Justice.
We will focus on recidivism rates of inmates from certain countries, namely Romani-
ans and Bulgarians, who acquired the right to reside and work in Italy (as in most other
European countries) after the EU enlargement in January 2007. Figure 3 documents the
treatment: The number of Romanians and Bulgarians tracked down by the Italian police
(and often deported) drops from the tens of thousands to essentially zero, while no signifi-
cant change is observed for illegal immigrants from countries that are expected to join the
EU in the near future (Albania, Montenegro, Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
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Iceland, Kosovo, and Serbia).3
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Figure 3. : Number of tracked-down immigrants, and the fraction expelled
Source: Marzio Barbagli and Asher Colombo (2010)
The unconditional difference-in-differences in recidivism rates of Romanians and Bul-
garians relative to a control group of inmates from candidate EU member countries, be-
fore (August-December 2006) and after (January-June 2007) the enlargement, equals -3.2
percentage points, or -50 percent of the pretreatment recidivism (equal between the two
groups). As in most other countries, illegal residence by itself is not a criminal offense, so it
cannot explain these differences, nor can differential access to alternatives to institutional-
ization (e.g., home detention), because all recidivists have to face prison time. These results
are confirmed when we control (using both semiparametric and parametric methods) for a
baseline hazard function of time-at-risk, as well as for preenlargement differences between
inmates from Romania and Bulgaria and inmates from the EU candidate countries.
It is difficult to judge the external validity of our estimate. On the one hand, former
inmates are more likely to be at the margin between legal and illegal behavior, and so
it is not surprising that recidivism studies form the bulk of the individual-level evidence
in the empirical crime literature (see, for instance, Witte, 1980; Lee and McCrary, 2009).
On the other hand, our quasi-experiment focuses on former inmates from a specific set of
eastern European countries (mainly Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania). How representative
is this group with respect to the total population of illegal immigrants in Italy (and,
possibly, in Europe)? According to Eurostat data (Herm, 2008), in 2006 eastern Europeans
represented 23 percent of all non-EU immigrants to Europe, and Romanians represented
the largest non-EU group of immigrants to the EU.4 While we do not argue that our
estimates apply generally to any immigrant group, the massive flows of eastern European
3The data in Figure 3 are only available for Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Montenegro, and Turkey, yet the
econometric analysis will be based on the entire population of released inmates.
4Such numbers increased after the enlargement. In 2012, Romanians alone represented 7 percent of all non-
nationals living in the European Union, Albanians 3 percent, and Bulgarians 1.5 percent.
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immigrants (particularly Romanians) to several European countries extend the importance
of our results beyond Italy.
The effects are also likely to differ depending on the value of legal status, which in turn
depends on labor market conditions and the degree of illegality in the host country. In
countries with slack labor markets or with large unofficial sectors, obtaining legal status
may not be sufficient to improve immigrants’ economic opportunities. In this respect, Italy,
with its massive economic differences between a very poor South and a very rich North,
is an ideal testing ground. Indeed, we find that recidivism falls only for economically
motivated offenders, and the reductions are larger in areas offering better legitimate income
opportunities to legal immigrants.
A battery of falsification tests suggest that these results are not driven by the specific
characteristics of the control group, nor by other events occurring during the same pe-
riod. Estimates of peer effects across nationalities refute that the estimates are biased by
substitution or complementarity in crime between treated and control groups. Finally, we
also discuss the possibility of differential attrition due to mobility across the border of the
newly legalized immigrants, and we argue that mobility among Romanians and Bulgarians
should have been greater before the acquisition of legal status – thus biasing our estimates
toward zero.
To put our results in perspective, we show in the next section that legal immigrants
in Italy have an 80-90 percent lower probability of being arrested compared to illegals.
Therefore, our results suggest that the causal effect of legal status accounts for between
1/2 and 2/3 of this difference. The remaining part may be explained by selection into legal
status, or a different probability of imprisonment conditional upon having committed a
crime, or both. While these factors are kept constant across all pardoned inmates in our
sample, legal and illegal immigrants would generally differ in these respects.
This paper contributes to the literature on the social and economic effects of immigra-
tion. Until very recently, research in this area has focused mainly on the labor market
competition between immigrants and natives (surveys include Borjas, 1994; Friedberg and
Hunt, 1995; Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmermann, 2000; Card, 2005), as well as the effects of
immigration on taxes (Storesletten, 2000; Lee and Miller, 2000; Chojnicki, Docquier and
Ragot, 2005) and prices (Lach, 2007; Cortes, 2008). However, Card, Dustmann and Pre-
ston (2012) show that besides these more “economic” issues, natives’ support for migration
restrictions is also (and indeed mostly) shaped by other “compositional amenities”, among
which crime plays a major role (see also Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmermann, 2000).
In response to these concerns, a burgeoning literature documents the empirical relation-
ship between immigration and crime across local areas within the United States (Butcher
and Piehl, 1998; Reid et al., 2005; Moehling and Piehl, 2009; Borjas, Grogger and Han-
son, 2010; Wadsworth, 2010; Spenkuch, 2014), the United Kingdom (Bell, Machin and
Fasani, 2013), Italy (Bianchi, Buonanno and Pinotti, 2010), and Spain (Alonso-Borrego,
Garoupa and Va´zquez, 2012). However, the effect of legal status on immigrants’ crime has
remained largely unexplored, despite there being ample evidence that legal status improves
greatly the labor market opportunities of immigrants (Bratsberg, Ragan and Nasir, 2002;
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Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002; Kaushal, 2006; Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak and Raphael,
2007; Lozano and Sorensen, 2011).
We fill this gap by estimating the causal effect of legal status on crime. In doing so,
our paper complements parallel work on the consequences of the 1986 Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA), which granted legal status to unauthorized immigrants in the
United States. Baker (2013) shows that the IRCA decreased local crime rates across U.S.
counties, while Freedman, Owens and Bohn (2013) document an increase in the number
of charges filed against Hispanic residents of San Antonio, Texas, after the expiration of
the IRCA amnesty deadline. Relative to these papers, we take advantage of a clean quasi-
experimental design and of longitudinal, individual-level data, which allow us to separate
causal effects from selection.
Our results also speak to a large empirical literature on the relationship between le-
gitimate income opportunities and criminal careers. The existence of such a relationship
is indeed the key result of the economic model of crime (Becker, 1968), and several pa-
pers found a good deal of evidence consistent with it: a nonexhaustive list includes Witte
(1980), Meyers (1983), Grogger (1998), Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002), and Machin
and Meghir (2004). We show that even among foreign immigrants, access to better legiti-
mate income opportunities - through the acquisition of legal status - lowers the propensity
to engage in crime.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the institutional
features of the Italian migration system that are most relevant for our analysis; Section II
describes the natural experiment; Section III presents the empirical results; and Section
IV concludes.
I. Legal and illegal immigrants in Italy
Immigration in Italy is a very recent phenomenon. After centuries of massive emigration,
net inflows turned positive only in the late 1980s. During the past two decades, the number
of foreign official residents rose from less than 600,000 to 4.5 million.
A. Work permits
The main way foreigners obtain legal residence in Italy is by receiving a work-related
permit; however, the application procedure greatly hampers the match between demand
and supply of foreign workers. In principle, migration law N. 189/2002 dictates that
employers must post job offers in Italian consulates worldwide. Upon finding an employer
who is willing to act as a sponsor, the prospective migrant is supposed to apply for a
residence permit; if the application makes it into the yearly migration quotas set by the
government, the prospective migrant receives a residence permit from the consulate and
can finally migrate to Italy.
Given that it is almost impossible to find a sponsor without a direct contact, many
immigrants cross the border illegally (or they enter the country as tourists and overstay
the tourist visa) to search for an employer who is willing to sponsor their application. In
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practice, however, the chances of later regularization after entering illegally are extremely
low, because of the tight rationing of residence permits. For instance, 170,000 permits
were issued in 2007 against more than 740,000 applicants; the following year, the number
of new residence permits decreased to 150,000, to be assigned primarily to applications left
pending the year before.
The systematic mismatch between applications and quotas creates a large pool of illegal
immigrants, who have little or no chance of finding stable employment in the official sector
and regularizing their residence status. Thus, most of them remain unemployed or work
for lower wages in the unofficial economy, which in turn lowers the opportunity cost of
engaging in outright criminal activities.
B. Crime Rates
An official report by the Italian Ministry of Interior shows that in 2006 (just before
the EU enlargement) about 80 percent of all foreigners arrested by the police for having
committed a crime in Italy were illegally present in the country (Italian Ministry of Internal
Affairs, 2007, p. 360). However, to compute the crime rate of legal and illegal immigrants,
one would need to know as well the size of the two groups (i.e., the denominator of the
crime rate), which may be difficult to observe due to the very nature of illegal migration.
Still, amnesties of formerly undocumented immigrants provide useful information in this
respect. On these occasions, illegal immigrants may, in fact, apply for a valid residence
permit under very mild conditions, and thus have clear incentives to report their (illegal)
status. General amnesties have been enacted every four to five years since 1986, growing in
size from 100,000 to 250,000 individuals during the 1990s, and reaching a peak of 700,000
in 2002. These figures suggest that the growth of foreign residents in Italy was paralleled
by that of unofficial immigrants, the latter representing about one-third of the total foreign
population in 2002 (Figure 4).5
Combining these pieces of information, the relative crime rate of legal and illegal immi-
grants is
(1)
E(C|L = 1)
E(C|L = 0) ≈ 12.5%,
where C = 1 for individuals reported by the police for having committed a crime and C = 0
otherwise, and where L = 1 and L = 0 denote the groups of legal and illegal immigrants.
This means that compared to legal immigrants, illegals are about eight times more likely
to commit a crime.6 Next, we examine what might explain such a stark difference in the
5Bianchi, Buonanno and Pinotti (2010) and Fasani (2009) use applications for amnesty to estimate the size of
the illegal population in Italy, Winegarden and Khor (1991) do the same for the United States after the IRCA.
6To compute (1) notice that
E(C|L = 1)
E(C|L = 0) =
cL
1− cL
/
rL
1− rL
,
where cL and rL are the shares of legals among immigrants reported by the police and among all foreign residents,
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Figure 4. : Residence permits, amnesties of illegal immigrants, and deportations
Note: The figure shows the number of valid residence permits (since 1971), applications for regularization of formerly
unofficial immigrants during the amnesty programs (1986, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2002), and the number of deportations
of undocumented immigrants over the period 1984-2006.
Source: Ministry of Interior.
likelihood of arrest.
C. Deportations and Selection into Legal Status
Much the same as in many Western countries, including the United States, residing
illegally in Italy as an undocumented person is a civil offense, not a criminal offense (Waters
and Simes, 2013).7 Illegal immigrants should be transferred to a detention center for
unauthorized aliens and, unless they qualify as asylum seekers, they should be deported
back to their country of origin. However, in many cases the procedure is not enforced–
because of the overcrowding of the detention centers and the cost of deportations–in which
case the apprehended immigrant simply receives an injunction to leave the country and is
immediately released. Still, the fraction of immigrants who are deported is not negligible.
Figure 4 shows that, for the years in which there was an amnesty, the ratio of expulsions
over the total number of illegal immigrants (as measured by the number of applications
respectively, and let cL ≈ 20% and rL ≈ 67%.
7In other words, illegal immigrants apprehended in Italy can not be sentenced to jail for the only reason of being
illegally present on the territory. The last reform of Italian migration policy (Law N. 198/2002) introduced the
possibility of incarceration for illegal immigrants that were reapprehended by the police after ignoring a previous
injunction to leave the country. However, such a norm was never enforced and was later deemed anticonstitutional
(sentence 223/2004 of the Constitutional Court, discussed in Ghersi, 2005). Interestingly, in June 2012 the US
Supreme Court rejected similar provisions contained in Arizona’s immigration law.
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for amnesty) climbed from 17 percent in 1986 to 28 percent in 1998, eventually declining
to 15 percent at the time of the last amnesty in 2002.
Deportations reduce the number of crimes committed in Italy by expelling from the
country a portion of the illegal immigrants, and some potential criminals among them. In
particular, the ratio in Equation (1) can be decomposed as
(2)
E(C|L = 1)
E(C|L = 0) =
1
1− E(D|L = 0) ×
E(C|L = 1)
E(C|L = 0, D = 0) ,
where D = 1 for the illegal immigrants who are deported and D = 0 otherwise, so E(D|L =
0) is the probability of deportation and E(C|L = 0, D = 0) is the probability of committing
a crime conditional upon not being deported. The first term on the right-hand side of
Equation (2) reflects the incapacitation of illegal immigrants through deportations, as
those who are deported cannot commit crimes in Italy.
Turning to the second term in Equation (2), it captures both the causal effect of legal
status on the individual propensity to engage in crime, and selection bias. Framing the
problem in the context of the potential outcome model (Rubin, 1974), it may be rewritten
as
(3)
E(C1|L = 1)
E(C0|L = 0, D = 0) =
E(C1|L = 1)
E(C0|L = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
causal effect
× E(C
0|L = 1)
E(C0|L = 0, D = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection
,
where C1 and C0 are the potential outcomes conditional upon having or not having legal
status, respectively. Selection bias is the main threat to identifying the causal effect,
E(C1|L = 1)/E(C0|L = 1), because we observe C0 only when L = 0, and, in general,
legal and illegal immigrants have different individual characteristics. For instance, more
educated individuals have better chances of finding employers willing to sponsor their work
permits.
Such differences are indeed apparent from survey data collected in the northwest of Italy
just before the EU enlargement. Since 2001, the Italian nongovernmental organization “In-
iziative e Studi sulla Multietnicit” (ISMU) has conducted yearly interviews with a sample
of about 9,000 immigrants in the region of Lombardy. Exploiting immigrants’ networks
around a number of “aggregation centers” (shops, telephone centers, bars, etc.), the sam-
pling design allows for inclusion in the survey of the illegal component of the immigrant
population (see Blangiardo (2008)). The results of the survey confirm that illegal immi-
grants are, on average, less educated than the legal ones; they also have lower earnings
and lower skill-premiums (see Table 1).8 There is also extensive evidence of the wage gap
suffered by illegal immigrants in the United States (see, among others, Bratsberg, Ragan
and Nasir, 2002; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002; Kaushal, 2006; Lozano and Sorensen,
8Drawing upon several rounds of the ISMU survey, Accetturo and Infante (2010) confirm these findings in a
multivariate regression analysis.
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2011; Barcellos, 2011).
The observed differences in earnings may reflect both the direct effect of legal status, as
illegals cannot work in the official economy, and selection into legal status, as witnessed by
the significant differences in other (predetermined) individual characteristics. In particular,
illegal immigrants are typically young, single males, and they are less educated and have
fewer children than legal immigrants. All these characteristics are associated in general
with a higher propensity to engage in crime, so the selection effect in Equation (2) may
potentially explain a large part of the difference in criminal activity between legal and
illegal immigrants. Our quasi-experimental design allows us to keep the composition of the
two groups constant, in order to identify the causal effect of legal status.
Table 1—: Legal and illegal immigrants: Individual characteristics, and labor market
outcomes.
Variable Illegals Legals Diff.
obs mean obs mean
Age 1280 31.29 7343 34.63 -3.34∗∗∗
(8.94) (9.36) (0.28)
Female 1281 0.39 7353 0.44 -0.05∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.50) (0.01)
Married 1281 0.34 7353 0.59 -0.26∗∗∗
(0.47) (0.49) (0.01)
Number of kids 1279 0.76 7339 1.18 -0.41∗∗∗
(1.19) (1.28) (0.04)
College 1281 0.14 7353 0.16 -0.02∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.37) (0.01)
Low-skilled 1281 0.12 7353 0.09 0.04∗∗
(0.33) (0.28) (0.01)
Income (euros per month) 949 824 5339 1130 -306∗∗∗
(371) (652) (22)
College premium 949 9 5339 112 -103∗
(35) (25) (62)
Note: This table reports the average characteristics of legal and illegal immigrants, as well as the between-group
difference in each variable. The source is the 2006 round of the ISMU survey, and the sample is representative of the
entire immigrant population of the Italian region of Lombardy. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote between-group differences that are statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence, 95
percent confidence and 99 percent confidence levels.
II. The natural experiment
A. The EU enlargement
In the wake of the EU enlargement, citizens of central and eastern European countries
became a large and growing share of total immigration to Italy, reaching about half of the
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foreign (official) residents in 2011. The first round of the enlargement took place in 2004
with the admission of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary,
Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia. Then, on January 1, 2007, Bulgaria and Romania
also joined the EU.
New EU member countries. — Romanians and Bulgarians had already been given waivers
to receive tourist visas to enter the EU with Council Regulation N. 539/2001, and the
absence of migration barriers inside the single market area (after the Schengen Agreement
of 1985) allowed them to move freely within the EU already before 2007. However, the
waiver was limited to a maximum of 90 days in each EU member country, after which they
had to move to another country, and they had no right to work there.
Compared to this former arrangement, Article 39 of the European Commission Treaty
allows citizens of new member countries five advantages: It allows them to i) look for a job
in any other country within the EU, ii) work there without needing any permit, iii) live
there for that purpose, iv) stay until the end of the employment relationship, and v) enjoy
equal treatment with natives in access to employment, working conditions, and all other
social and tax advantages that may help integration inside the host country.
In practice, however, several countries in Europe maintained significant restrictions. In
Italy as well, the application of the EU directives was at the center of a heated debate. On
December 28, 2006 – just three days before the enlargement – the center-left government
finally guaranteed full rights to the new EU citizens, lifting all restrictions on working in
the following sectors: agriculture, hotel and tourism, managerial and highly skilled work,
domestic work, care services, construction, engineering, and seasonal work. Such sectors,
indeed, account for the bulk of immigrants’ employment in Italy. In the rest of the official
economy (basically the manufacturing sector) migration quotas were also eased in order to
accommodate a larger number of workers from Romania and Bulgaria.
Therefore, admission to the EU basically removed the migration barriers faced by Roma-
nians and Bulgarians in Italy, granting them full rights to reside and work (as opposed to
a temporary residence permit, as was in place before 2007). For the purpose of estimating
the effect of legal status, they will thus constitute the treated group.
EU candidate member countries. — The process of enlargement is far from over, as sev-
eral countries are negotiating admission conditions with the EU; the EU candidate mem-
ber countries are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Iceland, Kosovo, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey.9
Such countries provide a natural control group for Romania and Bulgaria. They have
already started negotiations with the EU to gain admittance, so they should be most
comparable along the economic and political criteria required for admission. With the
exception of Iceland, they all belong to the same geographical area (see Figure 5); with
the further exception of Turkey, they also share a great deal of linguistic, cultural, and
9More details about the EU enlargement can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/.
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historical heritage. In practice, our sample of prison inmates pardoned in Italy will include
just a few individuals from Turkey (less than 1 percent of the total sample) and no one
from Iceland.
Figure 5. : New EU member and candidate member countries
Note: The map shows the countries admitted to the EU during the last round of the enlargement (in black), as well
as the group of candidate member countries (in gray).
Source: European Commission.
The Effects of the EU Enlargement in Italy: Preliminary Evidence. — The left
graph in Figure 6 shows the number of official residents for the treated and the control
groups, before and after the enlargement. The difference remained constant until the end
of 2006, the control group being about twice as large as the treated group. Then, in the
wake of admission to the EU, the size of the treated group nearly doubled, while the control
group continued to grow at approximately the same rate as in previous years.
The increase in the number of Romanians and Bulgarians arrested by the Italian police
was much less pronounced, so the ratio of those arrested over total official residents actually
declined for the treated group, while no significant change was observed for the control
group (see the right graph of Figure 6). At first blush, one might be tempted to conclude
that the removal of migration restrictions favored a decline in criminal activity. However,
the increase in the number of Romanians and Bulgarians officially residing in the country
includes both new immigrants and previous immigrants who acquired legal status only
with the enlargement (but were also present before), the two groups being indistinguishable
from each other. If the fraction of previously unofficial immigrants is nonnegligible, the
statistics on official residents would underestimate the denominator of the crime rate before
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Figure 6. : Immigrants from new EU member and candidate member countries residing in
Italy, and number of arrests
Note: The left graph plots the number of citizens of new EU member and candidate member countries officially
residing in Italy during the period 2002-2008. The right graph shows, instead, the ratio of those by the police over
the number of official residents arrested in each quarter during the period 2006-2007. In both graphs, the vertical
line refers to the date of the last EU enlargement.
Source: ISTAT and Ministry of Interior.
the enlargement, so its decline after the enlargement would just be a statistical artifact
of measurement error in the previous period. If the increase of official residents is instead
driven by new inflows, the change in the crime rate would depend not only on the causal
effect of legal status on previously unofficial immigrants, but also on the different selection
of new immigrants after the enlargement.
One way to address these issues is to focus on a sample of immigrants who were already
present in Italy before the enlargement.
B. The July 2006 Collective Pardon
Upon a collective pardon that was passed in July 2006, several hundred Romanian,
Bulgarian, and other eastern European immigrants were released from prisons all over Italy.
Collective clemency bills are deeply rooted in Italian history–over the last 40 years there
has been on average one every five years (Barbarino and Mastrobuoni, 2014). Such pardons
eliminate part of the inmates’ sentences, typically two or three years, and inmates whose
residual sentence is below such a length are immediately released. Given their wide reach,
and a skewed distribution of residual jail time, pardons generate sudden releases of large
numbers of inmates. The only offenders who do not receive pardons are mafia members,
terrorists, kidnappers, and sexual offenders, but even violent offenders, like murderers and
robbers, are released.
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The last pardon was voted on by the Italian Parliament in July 2006 and enacted shortly
thereafter (on August 1). We were granted access to the criminal records of all prison
inmates released on this occasion, including the exact dates of release and reincarceration (if
any) up until December 2007, their nationality, and a few other individual characteristics.
About 22,000 individuals, corresponding to more than one-third of the total prison pop-
ulation, were freed over a few days. More than 8,000 of them were foreigners, and with
subsequent releases their number grew to total 9,642 by the end of 2006. Since a neces-
sary condition for obtaining a residence permit in Italy is having a clean criminal record
and a job, these individuals were illegal at the time of the pardon and should have been
immediately deported upon release. However, because of the massive size of the release,
only a handful of released inmates (7 in total, believed to be Islamic fundamentalists from
Algeria and Morocco) were expelled from the country (Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs,
2007). This explains why so many released inmates were able to recidivate and were back
in jail within a few days or weeks. About 800 were back by the end of 2006, before the
EU enlargement, and their number grew to 1,654 one year later, after the EU enlarge-
ment (Figure 2). Our empirical strategy consists of comparing the recidivism of pardoned
inmates in the treated and control groups, before and after the EU enlargement.
When interpreting the results, we take advantage of two other important aspects of our
quasi-experimental design. First, immigrants with a criminal record cannot apply for a
residence permit, so the only ones among pardoned inmates who acquired legal status
because of the European enlargement between 2006 and 2007 were those in the treated
group.10 While immigration amnesties would hardly be granted to ex-convicts, the EU
legislation grants legal status universally.11
Second, prison inmates pardoned with the Clemency Bill would be sent to jail immedi-
ately upon recidivating, regardless of their legal status. This prevents the emergence of the
following bias. While immigrants are not incarcerated only for being illegally present in
Italian territory (see Section I.C), they may still experience a higher probability of incarcer-
ation conditional upon having committed a crime. According to law, suspect offenders can
be incarcerated before trial if caught “red-handed” (flagranza di reato), or whenever there
is a significant risk that they will either destroy the evidence, recommit the same crime,
or escape judgment (upon decision of a special court, Giudice per le indagini preliminari).
Since illegal immigrants are usually deemed at greater risk of bad conduct they may, in
general, be more likely to be incarcerated than legal immigrants.
This is not true, however, in our sample of pardoned prison inmates, as previous offenders
are always deemed at high risk and incarcerated immediately upon arrest (regardless of
legal status). Moreover, the pardoned individual rearrested within 5 years of the release
must go back to jail to serve the residual sentence that was pardoned, with no possibility of
benefiting from alternative forms of detention (e.g. home detention). This means that the
police forces would have the same incentives to target pardoned Romanians and Bulgarians
10In any case, noncompliance with treatment – i.e., the presence of some individuals in the control group obtaining
legal status – would bias our estimates toward zero.
11It is considerably more cumbersome to expel EU nonnationals.
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and pardoned criminals from EU candidate countries. There is no obvious reason why it
should be easier to arrest and build the case against one group over the other, and why,
assuming there is such a difference, the difference would have to change with legal status.
Finally, no bail is allowed in the Italian judicial system.
These features of the Clemency Bill – and, more generally, of the Italian judicial system
– thus allow an interpretation of the relative changes in incarceration rates between the
treated and control groups as changes in the underlying criminal activity.
C. Sample
Our sample includes about 800 Romanians and Bulgarians, as well as 1,800 immigrants
from candidate member countries (none from Iceland). To reduce heterogeneity we restrict
the analysis to males – about 90 percent of the total sample – so we are left with 725 and
1,622 individuals in the treated and control groups, respectively. The row headings down
the left margin columns of Table 2 categorize the two groups in terms of the observable
characteristics reported in our data: age, gender, marital status, education (missing for
many observations), the type of crime for which the individual was first incarcerated before
the pardon (possibly more than one, so the group means of economic and violent crimes do
not add up to one), the length of the original sentence, and the months commuted under
the pardon.12
While marital status is not significantly different, Romanians and Bulgarians are on av-
erage younger and more educated than individuals in the control group; they are also more
(less) likely to commit violent (economic) crimes, but receive on average lighter sentences.
One reason may be that the migration waves from some countries in the control group
(notably Albania and the former Yugoslavia) predate those from Romania and Bulgaria,
which makes for longer criminal careers in Italy, a higher incidence of repeat offenders,
and longer sentences as a consequence. To the extent that such differences are correlated
with criminal activity, the “parallel paths” assumption behind our difference-in-differences
approach may be violated.
However, if we are willing to assume that deviations from the “parallel paths” depend
solely upon differences in observable characteristics, conditioning on such differences re-
moves all biases. While conditional independence may be a stringent requirement, notice
that we are imposing it on changes in the crime rate over time (as opposed to levels); that
is, we allow for (time-invariant) differences between groups to persist even after condition-
ing on observable characteristics. Most importantly, the availability of longitudinal data
for the pretreatment period provides us with the opportunity to investigate the plausibility
of this assumption.
Following Abadie (2005), we thus weight observations by the (inverse) propensity score of
assignment–i.e., the probability of belonging to each group, conditional upon the observed
12The data also report the prison from which the individual was released (167 institutes in total), which we use
later in the analysis.
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covariates. Specifically, the weight attached to each i-th observation is
(4) new EUi
p
P (Xi)
+ (1− new EUi) 1− p
1− P (Xi) ,
where new EUi is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is a citizen of new EU member
countries and 0 otherwise, p is the unconditional probability of belonging to the new EU
group, and P (Xi) is the probability conditional on the vector of individual characteristics
Xi. The weighting scheme enhances comparability between the two groups by attaching
more weight to units that are more similar to the other group relative to the average
individual in the sample.13
To estimate the propensity score we estimate a logit regression for the probability of being
Romanian or Bulgarian, conditional upon the following vector of covariates: a quadratic
polynomial in age, marital status, education (indicator variables for illiteracy, primary
school, and secondary school, as well as for missing information on education), type of
crime committed when first incarcerated (seven categories), a quadratic polynomial in sen-
tence and commuted sentence, and a full set of fixed effects for the region where the prison
from which the individual was released is located.14 As expected, there is a tail of individ-
uals in the control group whose estimated propensity score is close to zero, meaning they
are very different (in terms of observable characteristics) from Romanians and Bulgarians
(see Figure 7). The inverse propensity score-weighting reduces the importance of such
observations, while it increases the weight of observations in both groups that lie in the
middle of the distribution of the estimated propensity score.
The right columns of Table 2 show that weighting observations according to Equation
(4) indeed eliminates all differences in average group characteristics. Whether it also
eliminates differences in unobservable characteristics is basically untestable, yet differences
in preenlargement outcomes between the treated and control groups, which we examine
next, allow us to assess the credibility of the conditional independence assumption.
III. Results
This section presents our estimates of the effect of changes in legal status on the number
of crimes committed by immigrants. We start by nonparametrically comparing differences
in the hazard rate of reincarceration (i.e., the probability of being reincarcerated in a given
period conditional upon not having been reincarcerated before) between the treated and
control groups, before and after the enlargement, then we estimate semiparametric and
fully parametric maximum likelihood hazard rate models. We conclude with a series of
robustness exercises and falsification tests.
13One important advantage of propensity score weighting, relative to other matching estimators, is the possibility
of computing asymptotically valid standard errors by bootstrapping methods (Abadie and Imbens, 2008).
14We dropped a few observations for which some covariates other than schooling were missing.
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Figure 7. : Propensity score weighting
Note: The figure shows the kernel density of the estimated propensity score across groups. The propensity score
is the probability of belonging to the groups of citizens of new EU member countries, conditional upon observable
characteristics. The estimate is based on a logit regression of a dummy for being Romanian and Bulgarian on a
flexible specification of the individual information included in our sample.
A. Preliminary Evidence
Figure 8 shows nonparametric estimates of the daily (log) hazard rates of reincarceration
for pardoned individuals from new EU member and candidate member countries. For the
sake of graphical illustration, we focus on inmates released during the first week after the
pardon (1,392 individuals out of 2,347 in our sample), so the horizontal axis represents
(approximately) the same duration-at-risk for all individuals.15 Since we are particularly
interested in the effect of legal status through legitimate earning opportunities, we focus on
individuals who were first arrested (before the pardon) for economically motivated crimes
(mainly property and drug-related offenses).16
The left panel shows the results obtained using the raw data–i.e., before applying the
weighting scheme. While Romanians and Bulgarians display greater recidivism during the
first months after the pardon, the opposite is true after they obtain legal status. As to
the plausibility of the main identifying assumption, the evidence from the preenlargement
period seems broadly consistent with the hypothesis of parallel outcomes (absent the policy
change). After weighting observations by the inverse propensity score (right panel), the
15All estimates presented next are based on the total sample.
16The data do not contain information on the crimes committed after the pardon.
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Table 2—: Sample statistics by group, raw and propensity score-weighted data.
Nonweighted Sample Propensity score-weighted
New EU Control Diff New EU Control Diff
obs mean obs mean mean mean
Age 725 31.083 1622 33.269 -2.187∗∗∗ 33.335 32.716 0.619
(7.597) (8.088) (0.355) (8.528) (7.914) (0.38)
Low education 725 0.339 1622 0.461 -0.122∗∗∗ 0.437 0.422 0.015
(0.474) (0.499) (0.022) (0.496) (0.494) (0.023)
No education 725 0.017 1622 0.017 -0.0001 0.015 0.018 -0.003
(0.128) (0.128) (0.006) (0.122) (0.133) (0.006)
Education missing 725 0.539 1622 0.404 0.135∗∗∗ 0.437 0.450 -0.013
(0.499) (0.491) (0.022) (0.496) (0.498) (0.024)
Married 725 0.257 1622 0.288 -0.031 0.266 0.277 -0.011
(0.437) (0.453) (0.02) (0.442) (0.448) (0.021)
Economic crimes 725 0.84 1622 0.894 -0.054∗∗∗ 0.857 0.877 -0.02
(0.367) (0.308) (0.015) (0.35) (0.328) (0.016)
Violent crimes 725 0.295 1622 0.242 0.053∗∗∗ 0.284 0.262 0.022
(0.456) (0.428) (0.02) (0.451) (0.44) (0.021)
Sentence (months) 725 20.31 1622 39.183 -18.873∗∗∗ 32.115 33.269 -1.154
(20.706) (32.33) (1.306) (30.63) (30.593) (1.435)
Residual sentence 725 9.305 1622 15.727 -6.423∗∗∗ 13.349 13.83 -0.481
(10.615) (14.784) (0.609) (12.917) (14.13) (0.646)
Note: This table compares the characteristics of Romanians and Bulgarians in our sample with the group of citizens
from EU candidate member countries. The first three columns report non-weighted averages for each group, as well
as the between-group difference for each variable. In the last three columns, observations are weighted by the inverse
propensity score, according to Equation (4). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗
denote between-group differences that are statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence, 95 percent confidence,
and 99 percent confidence levels.
level of the hazard rate is also very similar between the two groups, which provides strong
support for conditional independence.
To quantify the effect of legal status, in Table 3 we tabulate the hazard rate of rearrest
for each group over the last two trimesters of 2006 and the first two of 2007, their differ-
ences, and the difference-in-differences; we report both robust and bootstrapped standard
errors clustered by nationality and region.17 This allows for criminal activity to be corre-
lated across inmates of the same nationality who (likely) reside in the same region. While
bootstrapping generally leads to valid standard errors and confidence intervals for propen-
sity score-weighting estimators (Abadie and Imbens, 2008), Busso, DiNardo and McCrary
(2009) show that, for a sufficiently large number of observations, heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors provide a good approximation. The two estimates of the standard errors
in Table 3 are actually extremely similar; thus, for the sake of computational efficiency,
inference on the maximum likelihood models will be based on robust (clustered) standard
17Italy is divided into 20 regions and there are eight different nationalities in our sample. Since not all nationalities
are represented in all regions, the number of clusters is equal to 129.
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Figure 8. : Hazard rates of rearrest for pardoned inmates from new EU member and
candidate member countries
Note: The figure plots the nonparametric (Nelson-Aalen) estimates of daily log hazard rates of re-incarceration
between between August 2006 and May 2007 for Romanians and Bulgarians (solid line) and for the control group
(dashed line). The scale on the vertical axis reports the (estimated) hazard rate of re-incarceration in each day. The
left graph does not use weights, while in the right graph observations are weighted by the (estimated) propensity
score according to Equation (4).
errors.
The top left panel of the table shows the results for economically motivated offenders.
The second row confirms that, after weighting by the propensity score, the probability of
incarceration in the pretreatment period is identical between the two groups. The hazard
rate of Romanians and Bulgarians decreases from 5.8 percent to 2.3 percent after the
policy change, while it is unaffected for the control group; as a result, the difference-in-
differences is negative (-3.2 percent) and statistically significant at conventional confidence
levels. These numbers imply that the hazard ratio of committing a crime between legal and
illegal immigrants is close to 43 percent (0.023/0.054). In light of the simple framework in
Section I, the reduction in the propensity to commit crimes for immigrants in the treated
group (the second term on the right-hand side of Equation 2) outweighs the fact that the
potential criminals among them are not expelled any longer (the first term on the right
hand side of the equation).
The opposite is true for violent offenders (top right panel), though the result is not statis-
tically significant.18 For such offenders, criminal activity should depend to a lesser extent
on economic motives (Machin and Meghir, 2004), so changes in labor market opportunities
play only a minor role, and the effect of the negative change in deportations prevails.
Heterogeneity in the effect across criminal types is consistent with the fact that legal
18To be as conservative as possible, we include in this category individuals who were previously in prison for having
committed only violent crimes; those reported for both economic and violent crimes are included among economically
motivated offenders, as the latter crimes could be tied to the former ones (e.g. an assault during a robbery).
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status may affect criminal behavior by changing the labor market opportunities of the
legalized immigrants. While we cannot provide hard evidence in this respect, as we do not
observe the labor market outcomes of immigrants in our sample, additional heterogeneity
in the effect across Italian regions is also consistent with such a mechanism. It is a well
known fact that northern Italy is economically much more developed than the south, with
GDP per capita differences that are close to 50 percent.19 One aspect of this economic
divide is that the relative size of the unofficial economy is twice as large in the south as
in the north, so the change in labor market opportunities associated with the acquisition
of legal status should be greater in the latter than in the former. If legal status reduces
crime because it improves economic prospects in the official sector, one would then expect
the reduction to be concentrated in the north. This is exactly the picture that emerges
from Table 3 (bottom panels). The change in the fraction of Romanians and Bulgarians
reincarcerated for economic crimes in the north between 2006 and 2007, as well as the
difference-in-differences relative to the control group, is almost twice as large as the change
based on the whole country, while no significant differences show up in the south.
B. Cox Model
To probe these results further, and to exploit all the information about the dates of release
and rearrest, we fit a maximum-likelihood model for the hazard rate of reincarceration.
Following most empirical applications of survival analysis (see Van den Berg, 2001, for
a survey), we restrict ourselves to the class of proportional hazard models, in which the
hazard rate is the product of a common function of time-at-risk and an exponential function
of observable covariates. Specifically, the estimating equation is
(5) h(J |t, x) = λ(t) exp(α0post+ α1new EU + βpost× new EU + z′γ),
where h(J |t, x) is the hazard rate of reincarceration after t days since release from prison,
conditional on a vector x, including a dummy post for the (calendar) period after the en-
largement, a dummy new EU for individuals in the treated group, the interaction between
the two, and a vector of other observable characteristics z; finally, λ(t) is a common func-
tion of the time-at-risk. Following the semi-parametric approach devised by Cox (1972),
we leave the baseline hazard function λ(t) totally unrestricted and estimate the other co-
efficients by partial maximum likelihood. This way we take advantage of the tractability
of the proportional hazard model, while allowing at the same time for significant flexibility
in terms of functional form. Standard errors are clustered by Italian region and country of
origin to allow for within-network correlation in criminal activity.20
The estimated coefficient β captures the difference-in-differences between the hazard rate
19The economic divide between northern and southern Italy has long been studied (see, for instance, Eckaus,
1961; Helliwell and Putnam, 1995). Estimates of GDP differences are provided by the Italian Statistical Office,
http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/52316
20In Section III.C we show that the results change little when we generalize the proportional hazard model to
allow for unobserved heterogeneity and when we go for a fully parametric approach.
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of reincarceration for the treated and control groups, before and after the EU enlargement,
controlling for group-specific effects, calendar time periods, time-at-risk, and other individ-
ual characteristics. The exponentiated coefficient of the interaction term, exp(β), provides
an estimate for the hazard ratio of legal status–i.e., the (constant) percentage effect of
legal status on the probability of reincarceration. Such probability equals the probability
of going to jail, conditional upon having committed a crime, times the hazard ratio of
committing a crime,
(6)
h(J |L = 1)
h(J |L = 0) =
Prob(J |C,L = 1)
Prob(J |C,L = 0)
h(C|L = 1)
h(C|L = 0) .
As long as the probability of incarceration conditional upon having committed a crime
is constant across the individuals in our sample (see the discussion in Section II.B), the
first term on the right-hand side equals 1, so the exponentiated coefficient (6) provides an
estimate of the causal effect of legal status on the probability of committing a crime in
Equation (3).
The results are presented in Table 4. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative,
statistically significant (at the 95 percent confidence level), and very high in absolute value.
The exponentiated coefficient suggests that the hazard ratio of legal status is about 57
percent. These findings are unaffected when we control for the individual characteristics
reported in our data (column 2), which is consistent with the fact that the propensity
score weighting guarantees the comparability of the two groups in terms of observable
characteristics. (Notice also that the estimate for the group indicator is always very close
to 0.
Columns (3) and (4) distinguish between different types of offenders. In line with the
means comparisons in Table 3, the overall effect is driven by a reduction in the criminal
activity of individuals who were previously incarcerated for economic crimes, while the
hazard rate of reincarceration increases slightly for violent offenders (although this latter
effect is very imprecisely estimated). Finally, columns (5) and (6) confirm that the reduc-
tion in the hazard rate for economically motivated offenders is much stronger in northern
regions.
The results in Tables 3 and 4 uncover a strong negative effect of legal status on the
hazard rate of committing a crime in Italy. According to such results, the hazard ratio of
legal status is slightly above 50 percent for economic crimes, and is less than 40 percent
in northern regions. This is a sizable effect. In Section I.B we showed that, based on the
available estimates of the unofficial foreign population in Italy, the incarceration rate for
legal immigrants is about 12.5 percent that of illegal immigrants (see Equation 1). The
causal effect of legal status would then account for 1/2 to 2/3 of such a difference. The
remaining part would likely be explained by (positive) selection into legal status, as well
as by differences in the probability of incarceration conditional upon having committed a
crime. The latter is constant across our sample of former prison inmates, but could vary
in general between legal and illegal immigrants in Italy (see the discussion at the end of
Section II.B).
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As for violent offenders, the maximum likelihood estimates are also qualitatively similar
to the results in Table 3; the hazard rate of reincarceration increases, although the effect is
small and not statistically significant. Interestingly, if we plug a deportation rate of about
15 percent (see Section I.C) into Equation (2), and we compute the hazard ratio conditional
on not being deported (i.e., the second term on the right-hand side of the equation), such
a number would be very close to unity, 1.27 ∗ (1− 0.15) ≈ 1.07. This is indeed consistent
with the idea that legal status should have little or no effect on the behavior of violent
criminals, and the only reason why the crime rate increases for this group is that they are
not deported any longer after the acquisition of legal status.
C. Robustness
Next we subject our results to several robustness exercises and falsification tests.
Functional form and unobserved heterogeneity. — One issue concerns the functional
form and the estimation method. The flexibility allowed for by semi-parametric estimation
of the Cox model comes at a cost in terms of statistical power. For this reason, we estimate
a fully parametric model that imposes a logistic form on the probability of re-incarceration.
To condition the probability of rearrest on not having been rearrested before, we follow
Efron (1988) and estimate the model on the weekly (unbalanced) panel of inmates who are
at risk of incarceration during each period.21 The results, presented in Table 5, are in line
with those obtained for the semi-parametric model, both in terms of statistical significance
and magnitude.22
Another concern is unobserved heterogeneity. A fairly general result in the econometrics
of survival analysis is that variation in omitted factors would bias the estimates of both the
baseline hazard and the regressors’ coefficients, no matter what the correlation between
the included and excluded variables may be (see the discussion in Van den Berg, 2001).23
Notice that our difference-in-differences specification allows for the presence of common
unobserved heterogeneity in both the treated and control groups. The only serious threat
to identification would be the presence of a different degree of heterogeneity within the two
groups (i.e., a different distribution of u), but this seems unlikely given that such groups
are similar in terms of observable characteristics and preenlargement outcomes (see Figure
8 and Table 3).
21In practice, the cross section of observations for the first week includes all individuals released immediately after
the pardon, the one for the second week includes all those released until then and not re-incarcerated in the first
week, and so on; in this way we end up with approximately 142,000 person-week observations. Lee and McCrary
(2009) also adopt this strategy to estimate an empirical model of recidivism, while Ashenfelter and Card (2002)
apply the same methodology to study retirement choices.
22As shown in Allison (1982) and Card and Levine (2000), the two models give similar results as long as the hazard
rates are low.
23The intuition is easier to see for the baseline hazard: Whenever there is omitted heterogeneity in the hazard
rates, having individuals with the highest (lowest) hazards leaving the pool of those at risk earlier (later) would be
observationally equivalent to negative duration dependence. A similar argument applies to the derivative of the (log)
hazard rate with respect to the vector of covariates.
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In any event, we augment the proportional hazard model in (6) with an unobserved
component u, distributed according to the density g(u). Mixed proportional hazard models
of this sort can be estimated parametrically assuming that g(.) is a Gamma distribution
and λ(t) is a parametric function of time-at-risk t. We estimated both a Weibull and
an exponential model, and we could not reject the latter (i.e., λ is simply a constant).
Table 6 compares the estimates of the exponential model with and without unobserved
heterogeneity. No matter which specification and sample are chosen, without controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity, the estimated coefficients of the exponential model are very
similar to those of the Cox model. More importantly, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity
increases the magnitude of the interaction coefficient, suggesting an even lower hazard ratio
of legal status (about 40 percent for economic offenders, down to 27 percent in northern
regions).
Placebo Regressions. — Another concern is that the results might depend on the choice
of the control group. While candidate EU member countries represent a natural control
group for new EU member countries, we want to make sure that such choice does not drive
the results. For this reason, we randomly draw 1,000 samples of inmates from outside
the new EU member or candidate member countries and rerun the estimates as if each
of these placebo samples is the true treated group (we maintain the same group size, 724
individuals). Figure 9 shows that the densities of the placebo effects are centered around
zero, suggesting that the change in recidivism experienced by the control group after the
EU enlargement is not abnormal; what clearly is abnormal is the estimated effect for the
true treated group (vertical line), but only for economically motivated offenders. The p-
value reported in the last column of Table 7 equals the probability that the effect estimated
for a randomly drawn placebo sample is negative and larger, in absolute value, than the
one estimated for the true treated group. Such probability is always very low for the
subsample of economically motivated offenders (0.1 percent when estimated from the Cox
model), while the p-value is 25 to 27 percent in the case of violent offenders.
Placebo dates of enlargement. — We also run a series of falsification tests at different
placebo dates (rather than across placebo groups), in order to exclude the possibility that
we are capturing the effect of some other event besides the EU enlargement. In the spirit
of structural break tests with unknown breakpoint (Andrews, 1993), Figure 10 plots the
ratio of the R2 of the difference-in-differences model estimated at each placebo date in
our sample period over the R2 of a restricted specification without the interaction term,
distinguishing between different subsamples. The most likely break point for Italy as a
whole is December 12, which is very close to the official date of the enlargement and is
consistent with anticipation effects as uncertainty unravels during the last few weeks of
2006 (see Section II.A). The break points estimated separately for northern and southern
regions are very similar (December 1 and December 7), although the additional explanatory
power is much greater in the former case (as is consistent with the evidence in Tables 3-5).
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Figure 9. : The density of placebo effects
Note: The figure plots the distribution of placebo effects obtained for 1,000 samples that have the same size as the
treated group (724 individuals) but are randomly drawn from the population of former inmates that belong neither
to the treated nor to the control group. The effects estimated for the true treated groups are shown with a vertical
line.
Attrition. — In principle, the Romanians and Bulgarians in our sample could have moved
to other EU countries after obtaining legal status in the EU as a whole, in which case the
reduction in the hazard rate of reincarceration would be due to the fact that they spent
less time in the pool at risk (rather than due to changes in criminal behavior). Yet there
are at least three reasons why differential attrition between the treated and control groups
cannot explain the results (or may actually bias our estimates toward zero). First, the
tourist visa waiver granted in 2001 to Romanians and Bulgarians, and the absence of border
enforcement within the EU area (see Section II.A), allowed for significant mobility already
before 2007. Indeed, the 90-day term limit imposed on the visa waiver was computed
separately for each destination country in the EU, so between 2001 and 2007 Romanians
and Bulgarians had the greatest incentive to travel frequently across different countries
within the EU in order to avoid illegality. Therefore, the attrition rates for the treated
group should have been higher before 2007, in which case our estimates of the difference-
in-difference effect would be biased toward zero. Second, our findings point to a greater
effect for economically motivated offenders in regions that offer relatively better income
opportunities to legal immigrants. There is no clear reason why outflows toward other
EU countries should have been greater for such categories of immigrants; if anything, we
should expect the opposite.
Interactions in crime. — Finally, we address the concern that the (change in) criminal
behavior of Romanians and Bulgarians may have influenced the behavior of the control
group, because of interactions in crime between different communities of immigrants. If
immigrants in the control group increased their criminal activity in response to the decrease
by Romanians and Bulgarians–i.e., if there are substitution effects, our estimates would be
inflated–the opposite would occur in the case of complementarities.
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Figure 10. : Structural break test
Note: The graph plots the ratio of the R2 of the difference-in-differences in reincarceration between treatment
and control groups before and after each possible (placebo) treatment date in our sample period over the R2 of a
restricted specification without the difference-in-differences term. The vertical dashed line corresponds to the day
that maximizes the R2-ratio (i.e., the most likely break point), while the vertical solid line is the official date of the
EU enlargement.
To address this issue we explicitly include interactions in crime into our empirical spec-
ification, allowing the hazard rate of each individual to depend upon that of his peers,
both in his own and in the other group, and we follow Drago, Galbiati and Vertova (2009)
and Drago and Galbiati (2012) in exploiting quasi-random variation in commuted sentence
to identify such effects. In Section II.B we mentioned that, whenever released inmates
are rearrested within 5 years, the commuted residual sentence gets added to the new one.
Conditional upon the initial sentence, the commuted sentence varies only by the date in
which the first crime was committed, which in turn generates quasi-random variation in
the expected future sentence. Drago, Galbiati and Vertova (2009) exploit this source of
variation to identify the deterrence effect of the expected sentence on the probability of
reincarceration, while Drago and Galbiati (2012) allow such probability to depend also
upon the residual sentence of an inmate’s peers, defined as inmates of the same nationality
serving time in the same prison.
We further extend their specification to allow for interactions in crime between different
communities. Specifically, for each individual in the treated group we form two distinct
peer groups, including, respectively, all inmates in the treated and control groups that
served time in the same prison. (We define analogously the peers of each individual in
the control group.) A negative coefficient for the average residual sentence of the peers
from the other community would suggest that peer effects go above and beyond the same
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nationality – i.e., that there are complementarities in crime across nationalities. A positive
coefficient would indicate instead that inmates of a different nationality compete – i.e.,
there is substitution in criminal activity.
The results are presented in Table 8. Within our sample of new EU member and candi-
date member countries, we do find that (conditional upon the initial sentence) one’s own
residual sentence length lowers the hazard rate of rearrest, but the coefficients on the av-
erage residual sentence of peers of the same nationality is not significantly different from
zero (column 1). Only if we use a larger sample, including all foreign inmates, do we find
that peer effects within the same nationality matter (column 4). Most importantly for our
purposes, the average residual sentence of the peers who belong to the other group does
not seem to matter at all. The corresponding coefficient is never significantly different from
zero, no matter whether we control (columns 3 and 6) or not (columns 2 and 5) for the
average sentence of the peers of the same community. The coefficient is particularly small
for our sample of new EU member and candidate member countries (columns 2-3).
The absence of direct interactions between inmates in the treated and control groups and
their peers in the other group does not exclude the possibility of other (indirect) influences
in equilibrium. For instance, the other communities could take on the criminal activities
abandoned by Romanians and Bulgarians, in which case our estimates would be upwardly
biased; alternatively, police forces could target these other communities more intensively
after the decrease in crime by Romanians and Bulgarians, in which case our estimates
would be downwardly biased. Figure 11 plots the change (between 2006 and 2007) in the
number of crimes committed by all Romanians in Italy against the same changes for the
nationalities included in the control group, for different types of crime.24 A clearly positive
correlation emerges between the two. While we can hardly attach any causal interpretation
to this finding, this would hardly be consistent with strong substitution effects between the
treated and control groups. If the positive correlation was driven by complementarities,
our estimated effects of legal status would be biased toward zero.
IV. Conclusions
We use a natural experiment, namely the last round of the EU enlargement, to identify
the causal effect of legal status on immigrants’ crime, which is a priori unclear: On the
one hand, legal status may increase crime by precluding the expulsion of potential foreign
criminals; on the other, it lowers the propensity to engage in crime by providing immigrants
with alternative (legitimate) income opportunities. Evidence from a sample of former
prison inmates released in Italy a few months before the enlargement suggests that the
second effect prevails. In particular, the hazard rate of committing a crime decreases by
about 50 percent after obtaining legal status as a consequence of the EU enlargement.
This is indeed a large effect. Still, it does not account for the entire difference in crime
rates between legal and illegal immigrants, as computed in Section I.B. The remaining
part (between 1/3 and 1/2) is likely driven by selection of immigrants into legal status
24These data are not available for Bulgarians and some other small foreign communities in the control group.
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Figure 11. : Criminal offenses committed by immigrants from new EU member and candi-
date member countries, change over the 2006-2007 period
Note: The figure plots the (percentage) change between 2006 and 2007 in the number of Romanians arrested in Italy
for different types of crimes against the same change for citizens of candidate member countries. The area of markers
is proportional to the total number of offenses committed in each category.
and differences in the probability of incarceration conditional upon having committed a
crime (which is constant across the pardoned inmates in our sample but may vary in
general between legal and illegal immigrants). This strengthens the argument for a quasi-
experimental approach, in order to correctly identify the effect of legal status.
What about the external validity of our results? Admittedly, former prison inmates
represent a very peculiar group, so these findings cannot be easily generalized to the rest
of the immigrant population. But the great majority of people never engage in any type of
serious crime, which is why previous offenders represent an interesting sample to examine.
This segment of the population is more likely to lie at the margin between a criminal career
and legitimate activity, which is why recidivism studies form the bulk of the individual-level
evidence in the empirical crime literature (see, for instance, Witte, 1980; Lee and McCrary,
2009).
From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that the consequences of migration policy
depend crucially on enforcement. Whatever level of migration quotas is fixed, it should
be enforced, in order to prevent the formation of a pocket of illegal immigrants with
a very low opportunity cost of engaging in crime. Since 2010, the United States has
been speeding deportations of convicted criminals while halting those of illegal immigrants
without convictions. According to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency,
in fiscal year 2011 just under 217,000 immigrants convicted of felonies or misdemeanors
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were deported, accounting for 55 percent of all deportations.25 On top of their effect
of incapacitating deportees from committing future crimes in the country, such selective
deportations are also likely to represent additional deterrence against crime committed by
immigrants.
Finally, we focus only on the effects of the EU enlargement on the criminal activity of
undocumented immigrants already in Italy before the enlargement. Changes in migration
policy have far-reaching consequences for the size and composition of migration inflows.
In particular, subsequent rounds of the EU enlargement or amnesties of formerly undocu-
mented immigrants are likely to attract new immigrants from abroad, whose characteristics
may differ considerably from those of previous migration waves. Policymakers would also
need to estimate the costs and benefits along this additional dimension; this, however, goes
beyond the scope of the present paper.
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Table 3—: Probability of re-incarceration for pardoned inmates from new EU member and
candidate member countries, before and after the EU enlargement
Economic crimes Noneconomic crimes
New EU Control Diff. New EU Control Diff.
0.023 0.054 -0.031∗∗ 0.047 0.034 0.013
Post (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.020) (0.014) (0.025)
[0.006] [0.008] [0.010] [0.021] [0.014] [0.025]
0.058 0.057 0.001 0.033 0.043 -0.009
Pre (0.013) (0.007) (0.015) (0.028) (0.021) (0.035)
[0.014] [0.008] [0.015] [0.019] [0.022] [0.029]
-0.035∗∗ -0.003 -0.032∗ 0.014 -0.009 0.023
Diff. (0.014) (0.011) (0.017) (0.034) (0.025) ([0.043])
[0.014] [0.011] [0.018] [0.028] [0.027] [0.039]
Economic crimes, north Economic crimes, south
New EU Control Diff. New EU Control Diff.
Post 0.014 0.061 -0.046∗∗ 0.034 0.046 -0.013
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015)
[0.007] [0.011] [0.013] [0.010] [0.012] [0.015]
Pre 0.066 0.053 0.013 0.049 0.063 -0.014
(0.020) (0.009) (0.022) (0.017) (0.012) (0.021)
[0.020] [0.010] [0.022] [0.019] [0.013] [0.023]
Diff. -0.052∗∗ 0.007 -0.059∗∗ -0.015 -0.017 0.001
(0.021) (0.014) (0.025) (0.020) (0.017) (0.026)
[0.021] [0.015] [0.025] [0.021] [0.018] [0.027]
Note: This table reports the fraction of citizens of new EU member and candidate member countries that are
reincarcerated before (“pre”) and after (“post”) the enlargement, as well as the difference and difference-in-differences
between the two groups for different subsamples of pardoned inmates. The top left and right panels show the cross
tabulation for the subsamples of individuals that were previously incarcerated (before the pardon) for economic
and violent crimes, while the bottom left and right panels distinguish between economic offenders in northern and
southern Italy. Observations are weighted by the inverse propensity score according to Eq. (4). Robust standard
errors clustered by Italian region and country of origin are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote between-
group differences that are statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence, 95 percent confidence, and 99 percent
confidence levels. Bootstrapped standard errors, based on 400 replications, are also reported in square brackets.
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Table 4—: Cox model for the hazard rate of re-incarceration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Econ Nonecon North South
new EU -0.016 -0.027 0.002 -0.215 0.234 -0.256
(0.219) (0.216) (0.208) (0.987) (0.245) (0.307)
post -0.149 -0.171 -0.277 0.493 -0.343 -0.154
(0.336) (0.338) (0.392) (0.863) (0.560) (0.566)
new EU × post -0.563∗∗∗ -0.557∗∗ -0.668∗∗ 0.243 -0.923∗∗ -0.331
(0.215) (0.217) (0.286) (1.129) (0.427) (0.310)
exp(β) ≈ h(C|L=1)E(C|L=0) 56.9% 57.3% 51.2% 127.5% 39.7% 71.8%
Observations 4,177 4,177 3,653 524 2,013 1,640
Controls no yes yes yes yes yes
χ2 10.55 30.23 32.78 3.67 29.34 11.60
Note: The table shows the semi-parametric estimates of the Cox model (5) for the hazard rate of reincarceration.
The main explanatory variables are a dummy for citizens of new EU member countries, new EU; a dummy for the
period after the EU enlargement, post, and the interaction between the two. The exponentiated coefficient of the
interaction term provides an estimate for the hazard ratio of legal status, see Equation (6). The specifications in
columns (2) to (6) include as additional regressors age, age squared, a dummy for being married, and the length
of the sentence commuted with the pardon. Regressions are weighted by the inverse propensity score according to
Equation (4). Robust standard errors clustered by Italian region and country of origin are reported in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 90 percent confidence, 95 percent confidence,
and 99 percent confidence levels.
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Table 5—: Logit model for the probability of re-incarceration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Econ Nonecon North South
new EU 0.044 0.032 0.070 -0.215 0.245 -0.123
(0.229) (0.228) (0.223) (0.997) (0.248) (0.351)
post -0.201 -0.135 -0.155 0.032 0.179 -0.611
(0.237) (0.296) (0.354) (1.004) (0.424) (0.527)
new EU × post -0.623∗∗∗ -0.598∗∗∗ -0.711∗∗ 0.237 -0.880∗∗ -0.464
(0.219) (0.215) (0.284) (1.134) (0.406) (0.346)
Observations 142,124 142,124 124,019 18,105 68,151 55,868
Time at risk (quad.) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Calendar time (quad.) no yes yes yes yes yes
Controls no yes yes yes yes yes
χ2 52.26 81.22 54.73 12.75 73.55 47.07
Note: The table shows the parametric estimates of a Logit model for the probability of incarceration for immigrants
from new EU member and candidate member countries before and after the EU enlargement. The main explanatory
variables are a dummy for citizens of new EU member countries, new EU, a dummy for the period after the EU
enlargement, post ; and the interaction between the two. The panel of observations is unbalanced because we include
only the individuals who are at risk of rearrest in any given week. All specifications include a quadratic polynomial
for the duration of time at risk; columns (2) to (6) include, in addition, a quadratic polynomial for calendar time
and additional individual characteristics–namely age, age squared, a dummy for being married and the length of the
sentence commuted with the pardon. Regressions are weighted by the inverse propensity score according to Equation
(4). Robust standard errors clustered by Italian region and country of origin are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 90 percent confidence, 95 percent confidence, and 99
percent confidence levels.
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Table 6—: Exponential hazard model with and without unobserved heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline Econ Nonecon North South
new EU -0.014 -0.021 -0.026 -0.057 -0.023 -0.301 0.248 -0.332
(0.220) (0.254) (0.217) (0.253) (0.239) (0.871) (0.288) (0.371)
post -0.469∗∗∗ -0.161 -0.468∗∗∗ -0.090 -0.127 1.054 0.058 -0.039
(0.136) (0.236) (0.136) (0.312) (0.394) (1.590) (0.517) (1.127)
new EU × post -0.559∗∗∗ -0.779∗∗∗ -0.554∗∗ -0.803∗∗∗ -0.916∗∗ 1.088 -1.321∗∗ -0.573
(0.216) (0.292) (0.218) (0.331) (0.458) (2.393) (0.671) (0.637)
exp(β) ≈ h(C|L=1)E(C|L=0) 0.572 0.459 0.575 0.448 0.400 2.969 0.267 0.564
Heterogeneity no yes no yes yes yes yes yes
Controls no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
χ2 31.93 11.56 51.51 31.95 34.77 3.49 31.30 13.64
Observations 4,177 4,177 4,177 4,177 3,653 524 2,013 1,640
Note: The table shows the parametric estimates of an exponential hazard model for the probability of incarceration
for immigrants from new EU member and candidate member countries before and after the EU enlargement. The
main explanatory variables are a dummy for citizens of new EU member countries, new EU, a dummy for the period
after the EU enlargement, post ; and the interaction between the two. The specifications with additional controls
include also a quadratic polynomial for calendar time and additional individual characteristics–namely age, age
squared, a dummy for being married and the length of the sentence commuted with the pardon. The unobserved
heterogeneity is assumed to be distributed according to the gamma distribution. Regressions are weighted by the
inverse propensity score according to Eq. (4). Robust standard errors clustered by Italian region and country of
origin are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 90 percent
confidence, 95 percent confidence, and 99 percent confidence levels.
Table 7—: Comparison between the actual treated group and the placebo samples
placebo samples new EU
mean st. dev. p5 p50 p95 coeff. p-value
difference-in-difference
Economic crimes 0.010 0.024 -0.027 0.009 0.048 -0.032 0.026
Noneconomic crimes -0.014 0.071 -0.130 -0.013 0.098 0.023 0.273
Cox model, interaction coefficient
Economic crimes 0.212 0.271 -0.225 0.205 0.687 -0.668 0.001
Noneconomic crimes -0.166 2.883 -1.920 -0.405 1.458 0.243 0.249
Note: The table shows the parametric estimates of an exponential hazard model for the probability of incarceration
for immigrants from new EU member and candidate member countries before and after the EU enlargement. The
main explanatory variables are a dummy for citizens of new EU member countries, new EU, a dummy for the period
after the EU enlargement, post ; and the interaction between the two. The specifications with additional controls
include also a quadratic polynomial for calendar time and additional individual characteristics–namely age, age
squared, a dummy for being married and the length of the sentence commuted with the pardon. The unobserved
heterogeneity is assumed to be distributed according to the gamma distribution. Regressions are weighted by the
inverse propensity score according to Eq. (4). Robust standard errors clustered by Italian region and country of
origin are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 90 percent
confidence, 95 percent confidence, and 99 percent confidence levels.
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Table 8—: Interactions in criminal activity between treated and controls, estimates of peer
effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment and control group All foreign inmates
Residual sentence -0.015∗ -0.014∗ -0.015∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Peer residual sentence (same nationality) 0.010 0.011 -0.009∗∗ -0.011∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Peer residual sentence (other nationalities) -0.001 -0.004 0.014 0.013
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Sentence -0.007∗ -0.006 -0.007∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1767 1746 1746 6567 6565 6565
Pseudo R-sq. 0.0111 0.0103 0.0115 0.00689 0.00640 0.00699
N. clusters 331 320 320 1121 1120 1120
χ2 36.92 32.99 36.94 124.47 121.35 124.54
Note: The table shows hazard ratios of a Cox proportional hazard model. The sample for the first three columns
includes all inmates from new EU member and candidate member countries released after the July 2006 collective
pardon. The remaining columns use a sample that contains all foreign inmates. Robust standard errors clustered
by Italian region and country of origin are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote coefficients significantly
different from zero at the 90 percent confidence, 95 percent confidence and 99 percent confidence levels.
